On the 2nd of September, 1666, at around 1 in the morning the Farriner Family had all gone to bed. All except the 23 year old daughter of the family, who went downstairs to grab a candle. When Thomas, the patriarch, testified to authorities later on, he claimed that nothing was out of the ordinary and that the fire in the oven of the bakery he owned. However, modern historians doubt this claim, and they suspect that a stray ember had ignited some twigs that were being stored nearby.
Thomas Jr woke up and noticed that the ground floor was on fire and quickly alerted his family but it was too late. The Farriners were trapped on the second floor by the billowing smoke, forcing them to escape via an upstairs window and onto a neighbour’s roof, raising the alarm that a fire had broken out.
Soon the fire spread upstairs, claiming the Farriner maid as the first victim of the fire, and sparks flew to other houses on the street. Due to the architecture of 17th Century London, houses were tightly packed, which allowed for more space in homes but also fore the fire to spread more quickly. Not only that but the old Tudor style of building houses out of Wattle and Daub, essentially tightly woven stick panels glued with a mud like mixture, increased the spreadability of the fire. Despite the mud providing a fire proof cover for the wood, the poorer areas of London, where the fire started, were very decrepit, leaving the wood exposed.
One of the main documenters of the fire was Samuel Pepys, a diarist and naval administrator. His account showed that the fire did not bother that many Londoners in the slightest.
Some of our [maids] sitting up late last night to get things ready against our feast to-day, Jane called us up about three in the morning, to tell us of a great fire they saw in the City. So I rose and slipped on my [nightgown], and went to her window, and thought it to be on the backside of Marke-lane at the farthest; but, being unused to such fires as followed, I thought it far enough off; and so went to bed again and to sleep.
Samuel Pepys diary entry, September 2nd, 1666
Pepys’ experience was apparently the experience of many others too, who did not think the fire was that serious. However, what had initially appeared to be a relatively small fire had been transformed by a combination of unusually dry conditions, strong easterly winds and the densely packed streets of the City of London. Most of the buildings were constructed primarily from timber, with houses often projecting over the narrow streets and leaving very little space between them. The conditions were almost perfect for a fire to spread.
As the flames moved from building to building, thousands of Londoners began fleeing their homes. Many attempted to save whatever possessions they could carry, while others loaded their belongings onto carts and boats along the River Thames. The narrow streets quickly became clogged with people attempting to escape. The authorities initially struggled to respond effectively. London did not possess a professional fire brigade in the modern sense. Firefighting was largely the responsibility of local parishes, watchmen and private individuals. Leather buckets, ladders, hooks and primitive water pumps were used to fight the flames, but these methods were proving increasingly ineffective against a fire being driven forward by the wind.
The Lord Mayor of London, Sir Thomas Bloodworth, arrived at the scene but initially underestimated the seriousness of the situation. According to later accounts, he believed the fire could be dealt with relatively easily. By the time it became obvious that the fire was beyond the capabilities of ordinary firefighting, the flames had already spread considerably. King Charles II and his brother, James, Duke of York, eventually became personally involved in directing the response. The King encouraged Londoners to demolish buildings in the path of the flames in order to create firebreaks. Buildings could be pulled down using fire hooks before the fire reached them, creating gaps which the flames would struggle to cross.
This was an extremely controversial measure. Many property owners were reluctant to allow their houses to be destroyed, even if doing so might prevent the fire from spreading. In some areas, however, the authorities resorted to forcibly demolishing buildings. Meanwhile, the fire continued to advance. By September 3rd, the flames had reached the northern and western parts of the City. The wind pushed the fire towards the heart of London, while burning debris was carried through the air and ignited buildings some distance away. The River Thames provided an important obstacle on the southern side of the City, although warehouses and buildings along the riverfront caught fire and allowed the flames to spread further. Large quantities of highly flammable materials were stored along the waterfront, including coal, timber, oil and other goods. The fire was therefore not simply consuming houses. It was consuming the commercial heart of London.
By September 4th, some of London’s most recognisable landmarks were threatened. St Paul’s Cathedral, one of the largest and most important buildings in the city, caught fire after flames reached the surrounding area. Its destruction became one of the defining images of the disaster. The flames also destroyed thousands of homes and businesses, while churches, guildhalls and other public buildings were consumed. By now, the authorities had accepted that the only realistic way to stop the fire was to create sufficiently large firebreaks. Large sections of London were deliberately demolished.
The strategy began to work. As the wind weakened and the gaps created by the demolitions prevented the flames from jumping between buildings, the fire gradually began to lose its momentum. By September 5th, much of the main blaze had been brought under control. On September 6th, the Great Fire was finally extinguished.
London had been devastated. Approximately 13,200 houses and 87 parish churches had been destroyed, alongside numerous public buildings and businesses. Around 80 percent of the City of London had been damaged or destroyed. Despite the enormous scale of the disaster, the official death toll was remarkably low, with only a handful of deaths recorded. The true number may have been higher, particularly among poorer inhabitants whose deaths may never have been recorded. Tens of thousands of people were left homeless. Many fled the City and established temporary camps outside London’s walls, carrying whatever possessions they had managed to rescue. Others attempted to rebuild their businesses almost immediately, knowing that the economic life of the capital could not simply stop. The Great Fire was therefore both a human catastrophe and a financial disaster.
Yet it also created an opportunity to rebuild London. The medieval City had been a maze of narrow streets, wooden buildings and overcrowded neighbourhoods. The destruction gave the government and city authorities the opportunity to impose new building regulations. Rebuilding increasingly favoured brick and stone rather than timber, while streets were widened and buildings were constructed with greater consideration for fire safety. The rebuilding of St Paul’s Cathedral under Sir Christopher Wren would eventually become one of the defining architectural achievements of post-fire London. The disaster also demonstrated the inadequacy of London’s existing approach to firefighting. Although a fully professional London Fire Brigade would not be established until centuries later, the Fire of 1666 encouraged the development of better firefighting equipment, organised insurance-based fire services and eventually more professional methods of responding to fires.
The Great Fire had therefore destroyed much of the old City, but it also helped create the foundations of a safer and more modern one. At the time, however, few Londoners could have appreciated this future. For them, the week had been defined by panic, destruction and displacement. The medieval City of London had effectively ceased to exist. Out of its ashes, a new London would emerge.